Level 2 specification

NR/L2/TEL/30047

Management of Safety Related Reports for Telecoms Failures

Issue 5, December 2009

Sets the national process for classifying, recording, investigating and reviewing safety related telecoms failures (SRTFs) in FMS and SINCS, with a two-stage Maintainer then Reviewer review and a hazard index scoring system. Appendix A gives the failure and incident ratings for each telecoms system type.

Clause map — what each clause deals with

1	Purpose	Makes all safety related telecoms failures subject to one national classification, investigation and review system
2	Scope	Covers management of safety reports for telecoms failures, including helping other disciplines where telecoms may have contributed; signalling failures sit in NR/L2/SIG/10047
3	Reference documentation	Lists linked group and NR standards on safety reporting, CCS failures, competence, incident investigation and SINCS/FMS data entry
4	Definitions	Terms such as high, low and negligible risk, positive but wrong, noisy and faint lines, crosstalk, sole protection telephone and SRTF
5	Safety Management System Requirements	Every safety related failure goes in FMS; high and low risk ones also in SINCS, investigated to root cause by competent people
5.5	Two independent stages	High risk, low risk and incident records pass through Stage 1 by the Maintainer and Stage 2 by the Reviewer
5.6	Criteria for Stage 2 review	Only records above set thresholds (hazard index 25 or more, failure or incident rating 5 or more) or escalated by the Maintainer go to Stage 2
5.7	Negligible Risk	Everything else counts as negligible risk and is kept out of SINCS
6.1	The Integrated Control Centre shall	Control enters failures into FMS, creates SINCS records using the hazard index, caps early ratings when unclear, passes info to train operators and records test plans used
6.2	The Maintainer (Stage 1) shall	Maintainer checks and completes the SRTF record, investigates fully, reviews the hazard index, tracks trends and closes Stage 1 records
6.2.1	Record content check	Checklist of what the SRTF record must hold (system, cause, ratings, adjustment factors, test plan details) with a short deadline for updates
6.2.7	Trends and action plans	Recurring causes get a local project and action plan tracked on one master record; national issues flagged to the Reviewer
6.2.10	Closure target	Period-end target limiting how many records may stay open at Maintainer level, based on the previous three periods
6.2.11	Review of open records	Quarterly review of records open over 28 days; stalled ones may be closed as-is after repeated reviews with Reviewer agreement
6.2.13	Retention of records	Reports, test results and findings kept accessible for 6 years from Maintainer closure
6.2.17	RIDDOR reporting	Records meeting RIDDOR criteria are reported to ORR/RAIB under NR/L2/INV/002
6.2.18	Negligible risk check	Independent check that each negligible-risk telecoms record has been classified correctly
6.3	Stage 2 - The Reviewer (Network Rail Centre) shall	Reviewer monitors the whole system and statistics, looks for national implications, runs national action plans, returns or closes records and keeps them 6 years
6.3.12	Data Quality Check	Periodic check of each fault control's FMS entries for correct risk ratings, with set statistics collected and shared
6.3.13	Sample review	Twice-yearly random sample of one day's failures from each fault control, shared with the control manager
7	Competence of Persons Involved	Everyone handling failure records must be shown competent; the S&T professional head defines how
8	Audit	Maintainer and control centre audited, initially every two years, adjusted by findings
9.1	Hazard Index System - Introduction	Numerical scoring of safety impact using location, failure and incident ratings, optionally adjusted
9.2	Hazard Index System - Definitions	Defines location (fixed for telecoms), failure, incident and adjustment ratings and how they combine into the hazard index
Appendix A	Hazard Ratings - Incident Ratings and Adjustment Factor	Rating values for incidents (collision, derailment, near miss etc.) and adjustment factors for fatalities, workmanship or design faults
Appendix A (General)	Failure Ratings - General notes applicable to all equipment types	Common failure modes rated across all assets, such as recorder faults and non-service-affecting power or mechanical faults; unlisted equipment rated by agreement
Appendix A (A)	Signal Post Telephone System	Failure ratings for SPT faults: labelling, wrong signaller, poor speech and unable to call
Appendix A (B-D)	Crossing Telephones: Uncontrolled, Automatic and Controlled Crossings	Ratings for crossing telephone failures by crossing type, scaled by whether one, some or all phones are lost
Appendix A (E-J)	Tunnel, Emergency, Direct Line, Concentrator, Signalbox Emergency and ECR voice	Ratings for tunnel telephones, emergency telephones, direct lines, concentrators, signal box emergency access and electrification control voice services
Appendix A (K-N)	NRN/ORN, Cab Secure Radio and RETB	Ratings for legacy radio system failures: NRN/ORN, CSR and RETB (section M removed and merged into GSM-R)
Appendix A (O-S)	Traction Supervisory, DOO CCTV and Section 12 stations	Ratings for telecoms-provided traction supervisory links, DOO CCTV and mirrors, and Section 12 station PA, CCTV and telephones
Appendix A (T)	GSM-R Radio System	Ratings for GSM-R faults including loss of coverage on a line or route
Appendix A (U)	Marine Radio System	Ratings for marine radio faults such as loss of coverage and squelch or tuning problems